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INTRODUCTION
The absurdity doctrine of statutory interpretation is something of a
puzzle. Students of statutory interpretation are familiar with the typical
judicial refrain that where a statute's plain language is clear, courts must
apply it unless doing so would be unconstitutional. Yet courts often qualify
this straightforward rule with a troubling caveat: if applying the plain
language would lead to an absurd result, then the plain meaning may be
nullified. But what counts as an absurd result? How can we square this
rule with the traditional notion of courts being subordinate to legislators
when interpreting statutes?
The jurisprudential challenges posed by the absurdity doctrine have led
the Supreme Court to attempt to impose limits on its application.
However, the Court has never offered a comprehensive account of the
doctrine. As a consequence, lower courts have sometimes seized on the
absurdity doctrine and extended it well beyond any defensible bounds.
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The Third Circuit's recent decision in horpe v. Borough of Jim horpel
(horpe), concerning the treatment of the remains of the famous Native
American athlete James Jim) Francis Thorpe, is a case in point. There, the
Third Circuit nullified a statute's plain language because the court
apparently was troubled by the policy embodied in that plain language.
The opinion exposes the dangers of the absurdity doctrine and illustrates
the need for the Supreme Court to clarify its proper application.
This Essay offers the sad story ofJim Thorpe's remains as a case study in
statutory interpretation and the hazards of the absurdity doctrine. It calls
on the Supreme Court to clarify the doctrine and thereby impose limits on
its application. Most importantly, the Essay examines the Court's
piecemeal and sometimes conflicting accounts of the absurdity doctrine and
finds that the doctrine encompasses several distinct kinds of cases and
arguments. By offering a "taxonomy of absurdities" and demarcating the
limits of each category, this Essay proposes a way to clarify and improve the
absurdity doctrine.
I. THE LIFE AND DEATH OFJIM THORPE
Jim Thorpe came to be one of the country's most recognized Native
Americans. His life and death are noteworthy on their own and are
recounted briefly here to provide background to the decades-long dispute at
the heart of the Third Circuit's recent decision.
A. Jim horpe's Life
Jim Thorpe was born in 1887 within the Sac and Fox Indian
Reservation in what was then the Oklahoma Territory, near present-day
Shawnee, Oklahoma.2  Thorpe's father, a farmer, and mother, a
Pottawatomi Indian and descendant of Black Hawk, a Sac and Fox chief,
gave Thorpe the Native American name "Wa-tha-huk," meaning "the
bright path the lightning makes as it goes across the sky." 3 Thorpe came to
be one of the best-known Native Americans of his time, though his life was
one of both international acclaim and tragedy.
Thorpe attended the Carlisle Industrial Indian School beginning in 1904
1. 770 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom., Sac & Fox Nation of Oklahoma v.
Borough ofJim Thorpe, 136 S. Ct. 84 (2015).
2. Thorpe v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, No. 3:10-CV-1317, 2011 WL 5878377, at *1
(M.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2011); Pis.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ.J. at 4, Thorpe v. Borough of
Jim Thorpe (No. 3:10-CV-1317-ARC), 2012 WL 7985648 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2012)
[hereinafter Plaintiffs' Brief]; KATE BUFORD, NATIVE AMERICAN SON 6 (2010).
3. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 2, at 4; Jim Thorpe: The World's Greatest Athlete,
CMGWW.coM, http://www.cmgww.com/sports/thorpe/bio/bio.html (last visitedJan. 22,
2016) [hereinafter The World's Greatest Athlete].
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and began to gain recognition for his athletic talent; Thorpe played
baseball and ran track, excelling at both.4 In 1909 and 1910, he was
selected as a first-team All American in football.5 Two years later, Thorpe
went on to represent the United States in the 1912 Olympics in Stockholm,
Sweden, winning medals in both the pentathlon and decathlon. 6
Those successes, however, were short-lived. In January 1913, the
Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) learned that, for a short period of time,
Thorpe had played two seasons of semi-professional baseball before
competing in the Olympics.7 The AAU withdrew Thorpe's amateur status
retroactively and asked the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to do
the same.8 Later that year, the IOC unanimously decided to strip Thorpe
of his Olympic titles, medals, and awards, and declared him a professional.9
Though stripped of his Olympic medals, Thorpe went on to play
professional sports. He signed with baseball's New York Giants in 1913
and played with that club and others until 1919.10 Thorpe's football career
took off at the same time. First playing for the Indiana-based Pine Village
Pros in 1913, Thorpe then signed with the Canton Bulldogs, for whom he
played until 1920.11 Between 1921 and 1923, he helped organize and
played for the Oorang Indians, an all-Native American football team.12
Extraordinarily, it was recently discovered that from 1927 to 1928 Thorpe
played basketball with the traveling "World Famous Indians" of LaRue. 3
In 1950, the Associated Press named Thorpe "the greatest American
football player" and the "greatest overall male athlete."' 4
Thorpe married three times and had eight children. With his first wife,
Iva Miller, whom he married in 1913, Thorpe had four children.' 5 A year
4. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 2, at 3; The World's Greatest Athlete, supra note 3.
5. The World's Greatest Athlete, supra note 3.
6. Id.
7. Jack McCallum, The Regilding of a Legend, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 25, 1982),
http://www.si.com/vault/ 1982/10/25/625690/the-regilding-of-a-legend.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Jim Thorpe Statistics and Histor, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-
reference.com/players/t/thorpji0l.shtml (last visited Feb. 6, 2016); Jim Thorpe is Dead on
West Coast at 64, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 1953), http://www.nytimes.com/learning/
general/onthisday/bday/0528.html.
11. The World's Greatest Athlete, supra note 3.
12. Id.
13. Bill Pennington, Jim Thorpe and a Ticket to Serendity, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/29/sports/othersports/jim-thorpe-and-a-ticket-to-
serendipity.html?_r=0.
14. The Worldt Greatest Athlete, supra note 3.
15. SallyJenkins, Why Are Jim Thorpes Olympic Records Still Not Recognized?, SMITHSONIAN
MAG. July 2012), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/why-are-jim-thorpes-olympic-
records-stil-not-recognized-130986336/?all; The World's Greatest Athlete, supra note 3.
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after his divorce from Miller, Thorpe married Freeda V. Kirkpatrick, with
whom he had four sons: Carl, William, Richard, and John.1 6 The couple
divorced after fifteen years, and Thorpe was again married in 1945 to
Patricia (Patsy) Gladys Askew.' 7 Patsy was married to Thorpe at the time
of his death in 1953; they had no children.' 8 According to Thorpe's son,
Carl, "[Patsy] was a very assertive person. She was able to get Dad money
for personal appearances and things that he was doing for free."' 9 This
assertiveness came to play an important role in a half-century-long dispute
regarding the proper resting place of Thorpe's remains.
B. Jim Thorpe's Death and Burial
Thorpe died in 1953 at the age of sixty-five. 20 Patsy, to whom Thorpe
was married at the time of his death, was responsible for deciding how he
would be buried. 21 It is unclear whether Patsy had sufficient income to
afford a burial. 22 However, it was members of the community, and not
Patsy, who first contributed money and facilitated the arrangements for
Thorpe's burial.23
Initially, Thorpe was to be buried in the Garden Grove cemetery in his
native Oklahoma. A committee raised $2,500 to bring his body from
California to Oklahoma, where it lay in state.24 On April 12, 1953, Sac
and Fox Thunder clan members and Thorpe's Native American family
members convened at an Oklahoma farm for the beginning of "a two-day
funeral conducted in accordance with Sac burial customs and traditions."25
As the ceremonies commenced, however, Patsy, accompanied by law
enforcement officers, arrived at the farm, interrupted the ceremonies, and
had Thorpe's body transported to a crypt she had rented in another
Shawnee cemetery. 26
Patsy then commenced a process of locating a final resting place for
Thorpe's remains. At some point, she settled on Mauch Chunk and East
Mauch Chunk, Pennsylvania-two towns that were facing financial
hardship and looking to reinvent themselves. Patsy and the towns reached
16. The World's Greatest Athlete, supra note 3.
17. McCallum, supra note 7.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. BUFORD, supra note 2, at 363.
21. Thorpe v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, No. 3:CV-10-1317, 2013 WL 1703572, at *2
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2013).
22. McCallum, supra note 7.
23. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 2, at 4; McCallum, supra note 7.
24. McCallum, supra note 7.
25. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 2, at 5; see also McCallum, supra note 7.
26. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 2, at 5-6; McCallum, supra note 7.
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an agreement in May 1954-over a year after Thorpe's death-that set
forth terms and conditions for renaming the towns and interring Thorpe's
remains.27 Under the agreement, the towns were consolidated into one
borough under the name 'Jim Thorpe," while Patsy, her heirs,
administrators, and executors were not to cause Thorpe's body to be
removed.28 Pursuant to the agreement, Thorpe's remains were interred in
1957 in a mausoleum housed and maintained on land owned by the newly
formed Borough.29
II. THE AFTERLIFE OFJIM THORPE: SACAND FoxNATION V. BOROUGH OF
JIM THORPE
Since the interment, the Thorpe family members have quarreled
regarding the proper disposition of Thorpe's remains. Decades ago,
William Thorpe and his brothers considered bringing suit to return their
father's remains to Native American lands in Oklahoma. However, the suit
was never commenced due to disagreement with their half-sisters, who
thought the remains should remain in the Borough ofJim Thorpe.30 In the
1990s, William Thorpe also considered bringing an action under the Native
American Graves and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA or the Act), but did not
do so at the time.3 '
In June 2010, however, Thorpe's youngest son, John Thorpe, filed suit
in the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the Borough, asserting claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and NAGPRA.32 The suit requested that Thorpe's
remains be removed from their resting place in Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania,
and that the Borough be ordered to comply with NAGPRA's requirement
that they be repatriated to the Sac and Fox Nation." After John Thorpe
died, Richard and William Thorpe-Thorpe's only surviving sons-and
the Sac and Fox Nation were added as Plaintiffs in an amended
27. Thorpe v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, No. 3:CV-10-1317, 2013 WL 1728012, at *3
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2013).
28. Id.
29. Id. At the time of the agreement, many plans were made to revitalize the struggling
towns. For instance, there were thoughts that the Pro Football Hall of Fame might be
located in the newly-formed Borough. Additionally, the Jim Thorpe Memorial Heart and
Cancer Foundation was to build a hospital in the town, and there was discussion of a Jim
Thorpe museum. McCallum, supra note 7. Patsy even considered opening a tourist hotel
called 'Jim Thorpe's Teepees." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10-11, Sac & Fox Nation
of Oklahoma v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, 136 S. Ct. 84 (2015) (No. 14-1419), 2015 WL
3486600, at *11. None of these plans ever came to fruition.
30. Thorpe v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, No. 3:CV-10-1317, 2013 WL 1728012, at *3
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2013).
31. Id. at *3-4.
3 2. Id at *4.
3 3. Id at *4-5.
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complaint. 34 The only claims surviving from the initial lawsuit were those
under NAGPRA.35
A. The Purpose, Passage, Structure, and Provisions of NAGPRA
NAGPRA was enacted in 1990 "as a way to correct past abuses to, and
guarantee protection for, the human remains and cultural objects of Native
American tribal culture." 3 6 The Act was an effort to remedy the digging up
and removal of the contents of Native American graves for profit or
curiosity.3 7 For example, after instructions from the Surgeon General in
1868 for the Army to collect and send "Indian skeletons," so that he could
determine if Native American inferiority was "due to the size of the
Indian's cranium," the Army obtained 4,000 Native American skulls from
battlefields and graves.38 This order, along with a general disregard for
sanctity of Native American gravesites, resulted in 100,000 to two million
Native American remains and funerary objects being sold or housed "for
storage or display by government agencies, museums, universities and
tourist attractions."39
NAGPRA was passed "to strengthen federal protection of Native
American burial sites and to enable tribes to pursue the recovery of
sensitive materials in museum collections." 40 The Act protects Native
American "cultural items," defined to include human remains, funerary
objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony.4 1 To achieve its
goals, NAGPRA creates rights of repatriation in certain Native American
cultural items. First, it creates "a right to repatriation of Native American
cultural items-including human remains-that are excavated or
discovered on federal or tribal lands" after November 16, 1990.42 Second,
it creates a "right of repatriation" when cultural items are "possessed or
34. Id. at *4.
3 5. Id. at *4-5.
36. Thorpe v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied
sub nom., Sac & Fox Nation of Oklahoma v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, 136 S. Ct. 84 (2015)
(citing 173. A.L.R. Fed. 585).
37. H.R. REP. No. 101-877, at 11 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4367-
68.
38. Thorpe, 770 F.3d at 260; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Sac & Fox Nation of
Oklahoma v. Borough of Jim Thorpe, 136 S. Ct. 84 (2015) (No. 14-1419), 2015 WL
3486600, at *4.
39. Thorpe, 770 F.3d at 260.
40. Thorpe v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, No. 3:CV-10-1317, 2013 WL 1728012, at *14
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2013) (citing Martin Sullivan, A Museum Perspective on Repatriation: Issues and
Opportunities, 24 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 283, 283 (1992)).
41. horpe, 2013 WL 1728012, at*14; see also 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(A)-(D) (2012).
42. Thorpe, 2013 WL 1728012, at *14, *15 n.7 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-877, at 8-9
and 25 U.S.C. § 3002).
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controlled by museums or federal agencies." 43  The Thorpe litigation
concerns the provisions governing this second right of repatriation, also
referred to as the "museum provisions." 44
As defined in § 2 of the Act, a "museum" is "any institution or State or
local government agency . .. that receives Federal funds and has possession
of, or control over, Native American cultural items," but the definition
"does not include the Smithsonian Institution or any federal agency." 45
However, NAGPRA categorizes cultural objects into two groupings: (1)
human remains and associated funerary objects; and (2) unassociated
funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony. 46
Qualifying entities that have possession or control over Native American
human remains and associated funerary objects (the first grouping) are
required to compile an inventory of these items. 47 Where the museum or
agency is able to determine the cultural affiliation of particular Native
American human remains or associated funerary objects, it must notify the
appropriate "Indian Tribe or Native Hawaiian organization." 48 Once the
requisite inventory and notification procedures have been completed and
where a museum or agency holds the human remains of a Native American
or associated funerary objects, "a known lineal descendant of the Native
American or of the tribe or organization" can demand the return of the
remains for proper handling and burial on ancestral lands. 49 The museum
or agency, in turn, "shall expeditiously return such remains and associated
funerary objects."50
The different treatment of cultural items, depending on the grouping
into which they fall, plays an important role in NAGPRA's statutory
scheme. For example, NAGPRA recognizes that an agency or museum
may have a right of possession to either type of item. It defines a "right of
possession" as "possession obtained with the voluntary consent of an
individual or group that had authority of alienation." 5' A right of
possession in Native American cultural items confers benefits that differ
depending on the object's category. Under § 7 of the Act, if the agency or
museum can "prove that it has a right of possession" to "unassociated
43. Id. at * 14-15.
44. Id. at *15.
45. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(8).
46. See id. § 3001(3) (defining "cultural items").
47. Id. § 3003(a) (2012).
48. Id. § 3003(d). Separate summary and inventory provisions detail the steps to be
taken with respect to "unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects or objects of cultural
patrimony." Id. § 3004.
49. Id. § 3005.
50. Id. § 3005(a)(1).
51. Id.§ 3001(13).
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funerary objects, sacred objects [or] objects of cultural patrimony," then it
may retain them and need not return them to the claimant-in other
words, they are exempt from the repatriation requirement 2  But
NAGPRA, on its face, does not extend this exemption to human remains or
associated funerary objects.5 3  Instead, it provides that an agency or
museum holding a right of possession to such objects merely escapes
criminal prosecution for illegal trafficking. 54 That is, unlike cases where the
museum had no right of possession to the human remains, it will not be
subject to criminal penalties. Yet the repatriation requirement still
obligates the museum or agency to return this category of objects to lawful
claimants.
B. A District Court Win for the Plaintiffs
As previously noted, the plaintiffs in the suit against the Borough ofJim
Thorpe and others ultimately were Thorpe's surviving sons as well as the
Sac and Fox Nation. The plaintiffs sought "permanent injunctive relief
requiring the Borough to comply with . .. NAGRPA, declarations that the
Borough is a 'museum' as defined by NAGPRA and in violation of the
statute's requirements, and a judgment for attorney's fees and costs."5 5 The
district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and
granted their requested relief.
In reaching that decision, the district court concluded that the Borough
is a "museum" under NAGPRA. Specifically, the court noted that the
Borough did not dispute that "it has possession or control over the remains
ofJim Thorpe," or that 'Jim Thorpe was a Native American or a member
of the Sac and Fox Nation."5 6 Thus, the only matter to resolve was
whether the Borough had received federal funds as required by the
definition of "museum" set forth in 25 U.S.C. § 3001(8). On that score, the
court concluded that the Borough was the recipient of federal funds
because it had entered into agreements for federal funds available under
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA).51 The
52. Id. § 3005(c) (2012).
53. See Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)
Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,134, 62,153 (Dec. 4, 1995) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 10)
("The right of possession basis for retaining cultural items in an existing collection does not
apply to human remains or associated funerary objects, only to unassociated funerary
objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony.").
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 1170.
55. Thorpe v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, No. 3:CV-10-1317, 2013 WL 1728012, at *5
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2013).
56. Id.at*16.
57. Id.
2016] 127
ADMmISTRATIVE L WREVIEW
court also rejected the Borough's arguments that the doctrine of laches
precluded the plaintiffs' claims because they had waited fifty-five years after
Thorpe's burial in the Borough, and twenty-five years from the enactment
of NAGPRA, before bringing suit.58
The district court's opinion appeared to resolve the decades-long dispute
over the proper disposition of Thorpe's remains. However, that proved not
to be the case.
C. A hird Circuit Win for the Borough
The Third Circuit did not disagree with the district court's conclusion
that the Borough qualified as a "museum" under NAGPRA. It
nevertheless ruled against the plaintiffs, based on an unusually assertive
application of the absurdity doctrine.
1. he hird Circuit's Plain Meaning Analysis
In its opinion, the Third Circuit did not dispute the district court's
conclusion that under NAGPRA's plain language, the Borough qualified as
a "museum."59 Under § 7 of the Act, where a "museum" holds the human
remains of a Native American, the Native American descendants can
demand the return of the remains for proper handling and burial on
ancestral lands. 60 Section 2 of the Act, in turn, defines "museum" to mean
"any institution or State or local government agency . .. that receives
Federal funds and has possession of, or control over, Native American
cultural items." 6' As the Third Circuit noted, "the Borough has 'possession
of, or control over,' Jim Thorpe's remains"; "he is of Native American
descent"; and "the Borough received federal funds after the enactment of
NAGPRA."62 Consequently, the Borough necessarily was a "museum"
under NAGPRA's plain language.63
In most cases, this would be the beginning and end of the court's
analysis, and Jim Thorpe's remains would be headed back to his ancestral
home. The Third Circuit concluded otherwise.
2. Additional Support for the Plain Meaning Interpretation
Although the point went unstated in the Third Circuit's decision, the
58. Id. at *28-31.
59. Thorpe v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255, 262-64 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied
sub nom., Sac & Fox Nation of Oklahoma v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, 136 S. Ct. 84 (2015).
60. 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (2012).
61. Id. § 3001(8).
62. Thorpe, 770 F.3d at 262-63.
63. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(8).
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plain language interpretation is also consistent with NAGPRA's broader
structure, purpose, and legislative history.64 Furthermore, other textual and
substantive canons of interpretation also support this reading.
First, the familiar expressio unius canon of construction dictates, "When
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits
it in another section of the same Act . . . it is generally presumed that [it]
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."65
In other words, the canon reflects "the common sense language rule that
the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of another thing." 66 In
NAGPRA, Congress explicitly provided that, under certain conditions, a
"right of possession" negates the obligation to repatriate cultural items. 67
Yet this carve-out is expressly limited to "Native American unassociated
funerary objects, sacred objects, or objects of cultural patrimony." 68 The
presence of retention provisions applicable to certain cultural items-but
not to human remains such as those at issue in the Thorpe case-establishes
that Congress knew how to preserve a museum's ability to retain human
remains rightfully in its possession, yet chose not to do so. 6 9  In
circumstances such as these, the expressio unius canon precludes a court from
reading into the statute what Congress declined to include. 70
Relatedly, the plain meaning is buttressed by the principle that, "an
exception ... [to] a general statement of policy is usually read ... narrowly
in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision." 7' As the
Supreme Court has explained, "To extend an exemption to other than
those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the
interpretative process and to frustrate the announced will of the people."72
Congress provided a right of possession exception to the general policy of
repatriation of cultural items.73  It limited that exception, however, to
encompass only "unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects or objects of
64. See supra Part II.A.
65. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 528 (2003).
66. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEo. L.J. 341,
351 (2010).
67. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(c) (2012); see also supra Part II.A.
68. § 3005(c).
69. See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252 (2010) ("Congress
knows how to impose express limits. . . .").
70. See, e.g., Clay, 537 U.S. at 528; Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)
("Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally. . . .").
71. Comm'rv. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989).
72. A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945).
73. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(c) (2012); see also supra Part II.A.
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cultural patrimony." 74 In addition, Congress included other exceptions to
NAGPRA's requirements, none of which would apply to the Thorpe case.
Indeed, Congress's varied approach to different types of cultural items
when crafting exceptions to the repatriation requirement was hardly
accidental. The initial version of the bill introduced in the House treated
all objects identically.75 The enacted bill changed this, however, expressly
providing those entities with a right of possession an exception from the
repatriation requirement, while excluding human remains and associated
funerary objects from this exception. Although it is not entirely clear
whether the initial bill would have required repatriation of objects where
the entity in possession holds a right of possession, the point is that the
statute as enacted clearly makes this distinction. Consequently, in addition
to the expressio unius canon of interpretation and the principle that statutory
exceptions are to be narrowly construed, the plain meaning of the statute
finds additional support in the "rejected proposal" rule, which provides that
courts should not read back into statutes those provisions that appeared in
earlier versions of a bill but were changed prior to enactment.76
Finally, the Court has long endorsed the substantive canon of
interpretation that statutes meant to benefit Native Americans are to be
construed in their favor.77 Although this substantive canon has not received
sustained attention from the Court in recent years, causing some to
question its continued viability, it has never been rejected by the Court.78
Further, it is consistent with a broader strain of interpretation that provides
that statutes should be interpreted in favor of small minority groups.79
74. § 3005(c).
75. See H.R. 5237, 101st Cong. § 6(a) (1990); see also supra Part IIA; infia Part IV.A.
76. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 69,
84-89 (1988) (explaining the "rejected proposal" rule and discussing cases applying the
doctrine).
77. See, e.g., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 767-68 (1985).
78. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Policymaking, 118 YALE LJ. 64 (2008) (discussing the conflict between Chevron deference and
the rule that statutes are to be interpreted favorably to Native Americans).
79. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (noting that the rule of lenity
"places the weight of inertia upon the party that can best induce Congress to speak more
clearly," i.e., the politically powerful, who can more easily change the law through the
legislative process than can criminal defendants); see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice
Theog and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 715, 769, 771-72 (2013)
(proposing the rule of lenity as a partial response to the problem of overcriminalization);
Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutou Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2166
(2002) (viewing the rule of lenity as a way to protect politically powerless groups).
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3. The Third Circuit's Application of the Absurdity Doctrine to Nullfy the Statute's
Plain Meaning
Despite NAGPRA's plain language, structure, and history, as well as the
additional arguments favoring this reading, the Third Circuit nevertheless
concluded that the Borough of Jim Thorpe could not be a "museum"
under the statute because to treat it as such would lead to an absurd result.
Consequently, the court held in favor of the Borough. In support of this
conclusion, it identified two supposed absurdities in applying NAGPRA's
plain language: first, that the plain language would require repatriation
even where-as in Thorpe's case-the original burial was "in accordance
with the wishes of the decedent's next-of-kin;" 8 0 and, second, that
NAGPRA would be used "to settle familial disputes within Native
American families." 8' In other words, the court nullified the plain language
of the statute because it concluded that the legislature could not have
intended such a purportedly outlandish result.
III. THE USE AND MISUSE OF THE ABSURDITY DOCTRINE
Writing in a dissenting opinion in 1943, Justice Jackson referred to the
absurdity doctrine as "ill-defined."8 2 What was true then remains true
today, more than seventy years later.83 On what basis and in what kinds of
cases can a judge declare the plain language of a statute absurd? When
does doing so violate the principle of legislative supremacy and become
judicial policymaking? Legal scholars and judges continue to grapple with
these questions.
A major source of the problem in defining the doctrine is that courts and
scholars have conflated several different kinds of absurdity arguments, some
of which are decidedly uncontroversial, while others are subject to
substantial debate. The different kinds of absurdity arguments have
different justifications, resonate with different interpretive theories, and
have different applications. Courts have sowed confusion by invoking the
same rhetoric to different ends in different kinds of cases. By teasing out
these differences and identifying categories of cases, we can better
understand how and when invoking the absurdity doctrine is justified and
80. Thorpe v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub
nom., Sac & Fox Nation of Oklahoma v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, 136 S. Ct. 84 (2015).
81. Id.at265.
82. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 557 (1943) Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
83. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2486 (2003)
("The Court should permit such displacement only when the legislature's action violates the
Constitution, rather than an ill-defined set of background social values identified on an ad
hoc basis by the Court.").
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evaluate its application in a given case.
A. Scholarly and Judicial Debates: A BriefPimer
The justifications for and boundaries of the absurdity doctrine are
controversial and subject to substantial scholarly and judicial debate. After
all, if the absurdity doctrine allows judges to nullify the plain text of a
statute, is the doctrine simply an invitation to judicial activism?
Traditionally, the Supreme Court's invocation of the absurdity doctrine
resonates most with Intentionalist and Purposivist approaches to statutory
interpretation. 84  The idea is that judges, as faithful servants of the
legislature, must sometimes nullify the plain language of a statute in order
to carry out the legislature's true will.8 5 Where giving effect to the plain
language would lead to a manifest absurdity, judges should instead assume
that the legislature is not foolish, and therefore did not intend for the statute
to apply as written in a specific case. 86 Of course, Intentionalists and
Purposivists may disagree with one another about whether a given
application of the plain language of a statute would be consistent with, or at
odds with, legislative intent.87 In other words, absurdity is sometimes in the
eye of the beholder, which raises real questions about the viability of the
doctrine as a neutral tool ofjudicial decisionmaking.
Moreover, with the rise of modern Textualism, the traditional
justification for the absurdity doctrine has come under even more scrutiny.
Textualist scholars challenge the Intentionalist justification for the absurdity
doctrine as incompatible with the rule-of-law principles upon which
Textualism is founded.88  Consequently, John Manning, perhaps the
leading Textualist in the legal academy, has argued for a radically
constrained use of the absurdity doctrine. He suggests that the doctrine is
84. See id. at 2400 (discussing the background of the absurdity doctrine and how it fits in
with statutory interpretation); Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism:
Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutor Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 127-29
(1994) (discussing the definition of absurdity and its implications for theories of statutory
interpretation); Linda D. Jellum, But That Is Absurd!: MtJy Specific Absurdity Undermines
Textualism, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 917, 917-18 (2011) (analyzing the absurdity doctrine and
statutory interpretation).
85. Manning, supra note 83, at 2388.
86. Id. at 2390.
87. Compare United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203 (1979) ("It plainly
appears from the House Report accompanying the Civil Rights Act that Congress did not
intend wholly to prohibit private and voluntary affirmative action efforts as one method of
solving the problem."), with id. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress
intended to outlaw all racial discrimination, which would include affirmative action).
88. Manning, supra note 83, at 2391; see Jellum, supra note 84, at 919 ("In my view,
absurdity and textualism are simply incompatible .... ").
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defensible only where applying the plain meaning of the statute would
cause the statute to be deemed irrational under constitutional rational basis
scrutiny.89  However, Veronica Dougherty suggests that the absurdity
doctrine reflects and encodes important rule-of-law values, such as
protection of reliance interests, that are not captured in Textualist theory
and traditional notions of legislative supremacy, but that are nevertheless
critical to our system of law.90 In contrast, Linda Jellum maintains that the
concept of specific absurdity where a statute is declared absurd as applied
to a specific case-is wholly incompatible with Textualism. 91
These academic debates echo in judicial rhetoric. Perhaps surprisingly,
even Textualist judges sometimes embrace the absurdity doctrine.92 Justice
Scalia has gone so far as to sanction consultation of legislative history
anathema to him in other contexts-in the context of absurdity arguments
for certain purposes.9 3 That said, he sometimes fulminates against the
doctrine's use, 94 because he views it as leading down a "slippery slope" to
judicial policymaking.9 5 He argues that the absurdity doctrine can be
properly invoked only where both no rational person could have intended
the statute's plain language to apply and the text can be "fixed" by replacing
or adding a small number of words such that it appears that the statute as
written simply contains a drafting error.96
Similarly reflective of the debates over the absurdity doctrine are the
dueling opinions between Judges Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook in
the Seventh Circuit's case United States v. Marshall97 In that case, a statute's
plain language apparently required a defendant convicted of possessing
LSD to be sentenced according to the weight of the drugs in his possession,
including the carrier substance. In his opinion for the majority, Judge
89. Manning, supra note 83, at 2445-46.
90. See Dougherty, supra note 84, at 162-63 (arguing that the absurdity doctrine serves
the reliance interest); see also Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporau Meaning and Expectations in Statutou
Interpretation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1123 (2012) [hereinafter Levin, Contemporag Meaning
and Expectations] (stating that it would be unfair for a court to hold liable someone relying on
a previous ruling); Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent, 47 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1038
(2013) (arguing that the public has reliance interests, so even erroneous precedent should be
adhered to).
91. Jellum, supra note 84, at 919 ("In my view, absurdity and textualism are simply
incompatible .... ").
92. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-28 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (applying the absurdity doctrine to find an alternative meaning to the word
"defendant" in Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1)).
93. Id.
94. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ. (DOE), 550 U.S. 81, 108 (2007)
(Scalia,J., dissenting) (arguing against the Court's use of the absurdity doctrine).
95. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW 237 (2012).
96. Id. at 237-38.
97. 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Easterbrook, a leading Textualist jurist, conceded that this could lead to
anomalous results in some cases, but he nevertheless applied the statute's
plain text.9 8 In his view and in classical Textualist fashion-if the policy
encoded in the statute was problematic, it would be up to the legislature to
fix it.
In a blistering dissent, Judge Posner, today's most outspoken judicial
Pragmatist, argued that the statute's plain language was patently absurd as
applied to LSD, which is typically sold by the dose, in a form where the
carrier of the drug far outweighs the drug itself.99 Consequently, under the
plain language of the statute, someone with a single dose of LSD applied to
a carrier could be subjected to a much harsher sentence than a producer of
the drug in possession of hundreds of doses. 00 As a result, he maintained
that the plain language should not be applied, and the sentence should
depend on the number of doses rather than its weight.' 0' In short, scholars
and judges alike struggle with the absurdity doctrine's boundaries, with
debates often tracking differences in interpretive methodologies.
B. A Proposed Taxonomy ofAbsurdities
In this Section, we suggest that one reason for the continued uncertainty
concerning the absurdity doctrine and its proper use is that the doctrine
really includes several different kinds of cases. Because the Supreme Court
has never clearly articulated these differences-typically conflating them
under a single rubric-confusion reigns, and it is difficult to assess a
particular case in which the absurdity doctrine is invoked. Below, we
identify several different categories of cases in which the Supreme Court
invokes the doctrine. In offering this taxonomy of absurdities, we also
consider the justifications for each kind of absurdity argument, how
contentious each is, and how the Supreme Court has limited its use.
We note at the outset that a litigant or court may invoke more than one
type of absurdity in any given case. Indeed, cases in which the plain text
appears absurd for several different reasons may have stronger claims for
invoking the doctrine than those in which only one kind of argument
applies. Conceptually, however, the different kinds of absurdity arguments
are sufficiently distinct that they require differentiation.
98. Id. at 1317.
99. Id. at 1331-32 (PosnerJ., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1332-33 (PosnerJ., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1337 (PosnerJ., dissenting).
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1. Avoiding Absurd Results in Order to Resolve Ambiguities
The absurd results doctrine is most commonly deployed where a
statute's text is ambiguous. After determining that a statute's plain
meaning is unclear, judges often consider the policy implications of the
various plausible interpretations and adopt one that comports with
common sense and the statute's broader purpose rather than one that defies
it.102 In such cases, the absurdity doctrine is typically used alongside
various other "tie-breakers" in determining a statute's proper interpretation
and application, such as substantive canons of interpretation and legislative
history. This limited use of the absurdity doctrine is hardly controversial
and is acceptable even among Textualists. As the influential Textualist
Judge Frank Easterbrook put it, "Knowing the purpose behind a rule may
help a court decode an ambiguous text, but first there must be some
ambiguity."103
A typical example of this use of the absurdity doctrine appears in United
States v. DBB, Inc.104 There, the Eleventh Circuit was confronted with a
statute that allowed a court to issue "a restraining order to . . . prohibit any
person from . .. disposing of any . .. property [obtained through healthcare
fraud] or property of equivalent value." 05 The question in the case was
whether this statute permitted the government to obtain a preliminay
injunction preventing a defendant from disposing of "property of equivalent
value," or whether such asset disposal could be enjoined only in a
proceeding for a temporay restraining order.0 6
The court first concluded that the statute's use of the word "restraining
order" was ambiguous. On the one hand, that term often-including in
Black's Law Dictionary refers specifically to temporary restraining orders,
and not to injunctive relief more broadly, thus supporting the defendants'
claim that a motion for a preliminary injunction was not the proper vehicle
for such an order. 0 7 On the other hand, other dictionaries use the term to
include preliminary injunctions. Moreover, some other sections of the U.S.
Code refer specifically to "temporar restraining orders," thus suggesting that
the absence of the term "temporary" in this section indicates that the
102. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) ("Interpretations
of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative
interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.").
103. Nat'l Tax Credit Partners, L.P. v. Havlik, 20 F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal
citations omitted).
104. 180 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).
105. Id. at 1280.
106. Id. at 1281.
107. Id. at 1281 n.4, 1282.
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phrase "restraining order" is used in a more general sense.1 0 8
Having concluded that the statute was ambiguous, the court then turned
to other factors to determine the proper interpretation. As the court put it,
"When interpreting an ambiguous statute, a court should consider the
purpose, the subject matter and the condition of affairs which led to its
enactment, and so construe it as to effectuate and not destroy the spirit and
force of the law and not to render it absurd." 09 After reviewing the
legislative history and considering other factors, it concluded that the
"defendants' interpretation would frustrate the congressional intent and
lead to absurd results.""10 To avoid such results, the court held that the
statute was best interpreted to permit the government to obtain a
preliminary injunction.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has sometimes suggested that the absurdity
doctrine only applies in cases of statutory ambiguity. For example, in its per
curiam opinion in Commissioner v. Asphalt Products Co.,"' the Court reversed
the decision of the Sixth Circuit that limited certain tax penalties imposed
on the defendant due to the absurd results that would follow from applying
the plain language of the statute. In rejecting the Sixth Circuit's approach,
the Court held that "judicial perception that a particular result would be
unreasonable may enter into the construction of ambiguous provisions, but
cannot justify disregard of what Congress has plainly and intentionally
provided."11 2 Some lower courts have seized on this language to explicitly
reject the application of the absurdity doctrine whenever the plain language
of the statute is clear. For example, the Ninth Circuit has written that "the
absurd result doctrine applies where a court must pass upon an ambiguous
statute. The doctrine has no application where a statute is clear."" 3
However, most courts-including the Supreme Court-occasionally use
the absurdity doctrine to nullify even clear statutory text.
2. Xullfing Statutoy Text
The Thorpe case does not implicate the typical and uncontroversial use of
the absurdity doctrine because, as the Third Circuit acknowledged, the
Borough satisfied every element of the plain language of NAGPRA's
"museum" definition. Instead, the court deployed the absurd results rule in
a much more aggressive and controversial manner-to nullify the statute's
108. Id. at 1282.
109. Id. at 1283 (quoting Lambur v. Yates, 148 F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir. 1945)).
110. United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999).
111. 482 U.S. 117 (1987).
112. Id. at 121.
113. Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 75 F.3d 457, 468 (9th Cir. 1996).
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plain text.
This is not implausible on its face, for despite the Supreme Court's
occasional insistence on limiting the absurdity doctrine's applicability to
ambiguous statutes, in rare circumstances it has nevertheless applied the
doctrine to nullify the unambiguous plain language of a statute.1 4 Still, it is
these circumstances in which legal scholars and judges have expressed deep
concern about the rule-of-law implications of the doctrine and its
dangerous potential to become a tool for judicial policymaking.11 5 As a
result, virtually any time the Court has invoked the absurdity doctrine in
the context of unambiguous statutory language, it has cautioned against the
doctrine's expansive use."t6 In particular, it has warned that the absurdity
doctrine must never be used to substitute a court's policy preferences for
those expressed by the legislature in the language of the statute."t7
Unfortunately, the Court has never been explicit about when and how
the absurdity doctrine may be properly applied to nullify unambiguous
statutory language. This has led to confusion among the lower courts, with
some nearly rejecting it altogether, and others relying on it extensively."t8
However, it is possible to identify four categories of cases in which the
Court has ostensibly endorsed its use. By identifying and interrogating
these categories, it is possible to articulate the limits of the doctrine and
better guide lower courts' application of it.
114. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) ("In rare cases
the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the
intentions of its drafters, and those intentions must be controlling.").
115. See supra Part IILA; see also Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. DOE, 550 U.S. 81, 105
(2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("A judicial decision that departs from statutory text may
represent 'policy-driven interpretation."'); Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005)
("Although we recognize the potential for harsh results in some cases, we are not free to
rewrite the statute that Congress has enacted."); Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly
Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 52 (2008) ("We reiterate that it is not for us to substitute our
view of ... policy for the legislation which has been passed by Congress.").
116. See, e.g., Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930) ("An application of the
[absurdity] principle so nearly approaches the boundary between the exercise of the judicial
power and that of the legislative power as to call rather for great caution and circumspection
in order to avoid usurpation of the latter."); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438,
459 (2002) ("The Court rarely invokes [the absurdity principle] to override unambiguous
legislation.").
117. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 196 (1978) ("It is not our province to
rectify policy or political judgments by the Legislative Branch, however egregiously they may
disserve the public interest."); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
118. Compare Peabody Coal, 75 F.3d at 468 (stating that the absurdity doctrine should not
be used because the word 'proceeds' was not ambiguous), with Thorpe v. Borough ofJim
Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255, 266 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom., Sac & Fox Nation of
Oklahoma v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, 136 S. Ct. 84 (2015) (using the absurdity doctrine so
that the NAGPRA does not apply to Thorpe's burial in the Borough).
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a. Contextual Absurdities: Avoiding Tension in the Broader Law
The first category of cases in which the Court has endorsed the use of
the absurdity doctrine to nullify clear statutory text is where the statute's
text conflicts with the broader statutory structure and the law more
generally. Essentially, it is where the literal meaning of statutory language,
either in general or as applied to the facts of a particular case, makes no
sense in light of the law as a whole.
Some kinds of scrivener's or drafting errors fit into this category of
contextual absurdity. For example, in United States v. Coatoam,119 the Sixth
Circuit held that a statutory provision that referenced the wrong subsection
was an obvious drafting error1 20 based on the broader structure and context
of the statutory scheme.121 But not all contextual absurdities are traceable
to such obvious errors. Sometimes there is an irreconcilable conflict
between the language of a statutory provision in isolation and that of the
broader statutory context, due either to a lack of legislative foresight or
careless drafting. For an example of this sort of contextual absurdity,
consider Clinton v. City ofNew York,1 22 the well-known "line item veto" case.
Prior to deciding the constitutional question as to whether the line item
veto violated the Constitution, the Court addressed a jurisdictional
question. The plaintiffs in the case-the City of New York and others-
invoked jurisdiction based on a statutory provision that permitted
"individuals" to seek expedited review of constitutional questions.123
However, as a technical matter, the plaintiffs were not "individuals," and so
the defendant asserted that there was no jurisdiction for courts to hear the
matter. Nevertheless, the Court invoked the absurdity doctrine because
"the structure of [the statute]" precluded applying the plain meaning of the
term "individuals." 24  Rather, based on "the context of the entire
[statutory] section," 25 the Court concluded that the statute was better
understood to refer to the broader term "persons," which included the
plaintiffs. 126
119. 245 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2001).
120. See id. at 559 ("There can be no doubt that the reference to § 3563(a)(4) in this
amendment is an error.").
121. See id. at 558 ("We may properly examine the structure of the legislation passed in
1994 for interpretive assistance in deciphering Congress's meaning [even where the plain
language is clear].").
122. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
123. Id. at 428.
124. Id. at 429 n.14.
125. Id. at 428.
126. Id.; see also United States v. Coatoam, 245 F.3d 553, 558 (6th Cir. 2001)
(determining that the literal meaning of a statute led to an absurd result based on the
broader statutory structure).
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In many cases, the nullification of statutes due to contextual absurdity is
consistent with even a Textualist approach to statutory interpretation.
Although these cases are instances of such nullification, they often rely on
the application of textual interpretive tools to justify doing so. After all,
Textualists are not pedantic literalists.1 27  They care about the use of
language in its context, and not primarily about individual statutory
phrases. Thus, Textualist judges always consider how a particular statutory
provision relates to the rest of the statute, and even to other, related
statutes. Where they find a true incompatibility between a single provision
and the surrounding law, they may reasonably conclude that the isolated
provision in question does not mean what it appears to say, either as a
result of a scrivener's error or a lack of foresight or care in drafting on the
part of the legislature.128
This application of the absurdity doctrine is also consonant with a larger
group of interpretive tools that serve to impose consistency and stability on
the law as a whole. Examples of such tools include the presumption against
implied repeals,1 29 the presumption of consistency with the common law, 30
and the "One Congress" canon' 3 1-all of which operate to avoid conflicts,
instability, or unpredictability in the law. Deploying the absurdity doctrine
as a result of the broader legal context also serves this purpose because it
avoids interpreting or applying statutes in a manner that seems to
contradict or undermine the rest of the statutory language or legal
landscape. 3 2
In considering contextual absurdities, judges should be mindful that
nullifying the plain language of a statutory provision on this ground is
defensible only where the tension between that language and the broader
127. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 95, at 356 (distinguishing Textualism from "sterile
literalism" or "hyperliteralism").
128. Id. at 234-39 (discussing and approving of a version of the absurdity doctrine).
129. See id. at 327-33 (discussing the presumption against implied repeal); David L.
Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutou Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 937 n.77 (1992)
(providing an example of the canon of the presumption against implied repeal).
130. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 95, at 318 (examining the presumption against
change in common law); Shapiro, supra note 129, at 936-37 (discussing the interpretive tool
where "statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed").
131. See generally William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutou Interpretation, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 171, 173 (2000) (discussing the concept that it is a single Congress producing
legislation); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 95, at 322-26 (discussing what Scalia calls the
"prior-construction canon," which is a version of the One-Congress fiction); see also Levin,
Contemporay Meaning and Expectations, supra note 90, at 1126-27 (discussing the One-Congress
fiction).
132. See generally Shapiro, supra note 129 (discussing the canons of statutory interpretation
and how they foster contnuity over change); Levin, Contemporag Meaning and Expectations,
supra note 90 (arguing for a contemporary meaning and expectations approach towards
statutory interpretation in order to promote consistency).
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body of law is clear and not otherwise reconcilable. It is not necessarily
obvious or beyond debate whether an apparent tension within the law is
substantial enough to justify nullification of the text, and judges might
overreach in some cases. Nevertheless, because this use of the absurdity
doctrine relies heavily on textual interpretation and reflects broader judicial
values, in principle, at least, it ought not to be especially controversial.
b. Constitutional Absurdities: Avoiding Constitutional Problems
A second category of cases in which judges have sometimes invoked the
absurdity doctrine is that where applying the literal language of a statutory
provision would raise constitutional questions.
Consider, for example, Green v. Bock Laundy Machine Co.1 33 There, the
Supreme Court confronted an evidentiary rule that, read literally, would
require balancing the probative value of impeachment evidence against its
tendency to prejudice in civil cases where the impeachment evidence is
detrimental to the defendant, but would always allow impeachment
evidence detrimental to a civil plaintiff, no matter how prejudicial or how
little its probative value.1 34 Although there was disagreement among the
Justices as to how to construe the statute, all of them agreed that the
language could not be applied as written.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia invoked the absurdity doctrine,
stating, "We are confronted here with a statute which, if interpreted
literally, produces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, result. Our
task is to give some alternative meaning to the word 'defendant' in [the
statute] that avoids this consequence. . . ."'s5 In other words, the manifest
absurdity and potential unconstitutionality that would result from applying
the plain language required judicial nullification and rewriting of that
language.
In truth, this use of the canon could be framed as a specific example of
the contextual absurdity category of cases. Indeed, in construing the
statutory provision in Bock Laundy, the majority opinion, Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion, and the dissenting opinion all relied heavily on the
broader structure of the evidentiary code.1 36  Moreover, a statutory
provision that is in tension with constitutional doctrine and values is
inherently in conflict with the broader legal context because the
Constitution is at the core of our legal structure. Alternatively, this
category of cases might be better understood as a straightforward
133. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
134. Id.at509-10.
135. Id. at 527 (Scalia,J., concurring).
136. Id. at 508-09, 526, 530-31.
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application of the constitutional avoidance canon of construction rather
than an application of the absurdity doctrine at all.3 7 This might explain
why few cases invoke the absurdity doctrine in the face of constitutional
problems; instead, they simply invoke the constitutional avoidance canon.
Nevertheless, it happens often enough that it merits mention.
As with contextual absurdities, judges might overreach in invoking the
absurdity doctrine in this manner. They might nullify a provision even
where the purported constitutional problem with the plain statutory text is
minimal or questionable. That is, like any interpretive move, it can be
subject to abuse. But because the constitutional avoidance canon is itself so
entrenched in legal doctrine and encodes such venerable rule-of-law
principles, in principle this use of the absurdity doctrine should not be
particularly controversial.
c. Intentionalist Absurdities: Avoiding Direct Conflict with Legislative Histor and
Purpose
Next, the Court occasionally invokes the absurdity doctrine to nullify
statutory text when the legislative history reveals that the statute's plain
language clearly contradicts the clear legislative intent or purpose in
enacting the statute. 38 As the Court has stated, "The circumstances of the
enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did
not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect." 39
Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice offers an example of such
intentionalist absurdities. There, the Court considered whether a
committee of the American Bar Association (ABA) that rated potential
judicial nominees constituted an "advisory committee" under a statute that
subjects such committees to certain open records requirements.1 40 The case
137. See id. at 527 (Scalia,J., concurring) (stating that the Court must construe the statute
in a way that avoids producing an absurd and unconstitutional result); see also Note, Should the
Supreme Court Presume that Congress Acts Constitutionally? The Role of the Canon of Avoidance and
Reliance on Early Legislative Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1798, 1799
(2003) ("The canon of constitutional avoidance ... requires courts to construe statutes so as
to avoid ruling on potential constitutional questions.").
138. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice (DOJ), 491 U.S. 440, 454-67 (1989)
(applying the absurdity doctrine where an exhaustive review of legislative history
demonstrated that the words chosen by Congress did not reflect legislative intent); United
States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242-43 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (recognizing the legitimacy of
applying the absurdity doctrine in the "rare cases [in which] the literal application of a
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters," but
declining to apply the principle to the statute at issue because strict application of the plain
meaning would not truly "contravene the intent of the framers of the [statute]")
139. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981).
140. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 443-48.
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turned on whether the President "utilized" the ABA committee under the
meaning of the statute.141 The Court conceded that the plain meaning of
the word "utilized" would lead to the conclusion that the ABA committee
was indeed an advisory committee and consequently subject to the statute's
open records requirements.1 42 Nevertheless, it concluded, based in large
part on a careful review of the legislative history, that Congress did not
intend the statute to apply to the ABA committee.1 43
One can correctly intuit that Textualists would typically reject this use of
the absurdity doctrine. After all, Textualists usually object to the use of
legislative history, as well as to the very concept of legislative intent.1 44 But
it is not only committed Textualists who have expressed discomfort with
this application of the absurdity doctrine; courts in general have been
reluctant to apply the doctrine in these circumstances. For instance, in
United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,1 45 the Supreme Court recognized the
legitimacy of applying the absurdity doctrine in the "rare case [in which]
the literal application of a statute [would] produce a result demonstrably at
odds with the intentions of its draft[ing]." 46 But it declined to apply that
principle in the case because it was not entirely certain that applying the
plain meaning would truly "contravene the intent of the framers of the
[Bankruptcy] Code." 47
In another case, despite strong evidence in the legislative history that the
legislature did not intend for the plain meaning of a statute to apply, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that because the plain language was not altogether
unjustifiable, the legislative history could not override it.148 As the court
stated, "If courts could ignore the plain meaning of statutory texts because
their legislative histories showed that some (or even many) of those who
141. Id. at 451-52.
142. Id. at 463-65.
143. Id. at 455, 463-65.
144. See generally Hillel Y. Levin, Intentionalism Justice Scalia Could Love, 30 CONST.
COMMENT. 89 (2015) (reviewing RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT
(2012)) (explaining why Textualists oppose legislative history and the concept of legislative
intent in general); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 95, at 349, 369-98 (arguing against
the concept of legislative intent and the use of legislative history); Alex Kozinski, Should
Reading Legislative Histou be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813-14 (1998)
(summarizing why legislative history should not be used as an interpretive tool); Frank H.
Easterbrook, What Does Legislative Histou Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 441 (1990) ("It
is misleading to speak of 'the legislature' as an entity with a mind or purpose or intent, and
wrong to assume that the compromises necessary to enact laws are uniformly public-
spirited.").
145. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
146. Id. at 242.
147. Id. at 242-43.
148. Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 939-40 (9th Cir. 2001).
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drafted and voted for the texts did not understand what they were doing,
the plain meaning of many statutes . .. would be in jeopardy." 49
Consequently, this application of the absurdity doctrine is best seen as a
narrow one that applies, if at all, only where the contradiction between the
plain language and the legislative history is clear and there are other
problems with applying the text's plain language.
d. Policy-Based Absurdities: Avoiding Irrational Results
The final category of cases in which the Court has applied the absurdity
doctrine are those in which applying the language as written would lead to
a manifestly irrational result that would be "so monstrous, that all mankind
would, without hesitation," reject it. 1o This is the most controversial use of
the absurdity doctrine, for the separation-of-powers concerns are most
acute. It is here that courts must be most cautious. Consequently, the
Court has set the bar high for meeting this standard of absurdity, and cases
in which it is successfully invoked to overcome the plain language of a
statute are few and far between.
In describing this category of cases, courts sometimes use the language of
legislative intent. For example, the Court has justified applying the
absurdity doctrine to nullify the plain language where there is "no plausible
reason why Congress would have intended" the absurdity that would result
from applying the plain language' 5' and where Congress could not have
"intended [an] incongruous, absurd, and unjust result." 5 2 This rhetorical
appeal to legislative intent could lead one to conflate this category of cases
with the previous category what we have called "intentionalist
absurdities." But despite the use of such rhetoric, the two categories are
quite different. Here, what the Court means by referencing legislative
intent is that the legislature logically could not have intended the statute to
have such an outlandish result. As the Court once put it, it can use the
doctrine "to avoid an absurdity, which the legislature ought not to be
presumed to have intended." 5 3 In contrast, intentionalist absurdities are
149. Id. at 940; see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985) ("The fact that
Congress might have acted with greater clarity or foresight does not give courts a carte blanche
to redraft statutes in an effort to achieve that which Congress is perceived to have failed to
do.").
150. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 202-03 (1819).
151. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998).
152. Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 386 U.S. 731, 735 (1967).
153. Calderon v. Atlas S.S. Co., 170 U.S. 272, 281 (1898); see Fallbrook Irrigation Dist.
v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 172 (1896) ("Such an absurdity cannot be imputed to the
legislature."); see also Manning, supra note 83, at 2406 n.70 (discussing cases involving absurd
results).
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those where the legislative history indicates that Congress actually did not
intend the plain meaning.1 54
The most defensible kinds of cases that fit in this category are those in
which the absurdity in the plain language of the statute is so self-evident
that it can be explained only as the product of a scrivener's or drafter's
error. For example, in Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw
Transit Semice,1 55 the Ninth Circuit confronted a statute that required an
appeal to be filed "not less than 7 days" after the entry of a court's order.1 56
Read literally, this would mean that a litigant would have to wait seven
days to file an appeal of the order, and that after seven days, the time
period for filing would then be infinite, a result that would be
inconceivable.1 57 Consequently, in this decision, of which Justice Scalia has
signaled his approval,1 58 the court concluded that the statute included a
drafting error and that it should instead read "not more than 7 days." 59
Indeed, this case seems to meet Justice Scalia's two-part criteria for
applying the absurdity doctrine.160
Beyond the narrow set of cases that could qualify as scrivener's or
drafter's errors, however, the Supreme Court has rarely agreed with
litigants who advocate the nullification a statute's plain language based on
apparently outlandish results. For example, in Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors,
Inc.,161 the Supreme Court rejected an absurdity argument in favor of
applying a statute's plain language-even though the plain language
resulted in a windfall award of more than $300,000 due to lost wages of
only $412.50.162 As the Court explained, "Laws enacted with good
intention, when put to the test, frequently, and to the surprise of the law
maker himself, turn out to be mischievous, absurd or otherwise
objectionable. But in such case the remedy lies with the law making
authority, and not with the courts."16 3
Indeed, the Court has repeatedly warned against the danger of judges
154. See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., 435
F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Even where the plain language appears to settle the
question, we may nonetheless look to the legislative history to determine whether there is
clearly expressed legislative mtention contrary to that language that overcomes the strong
presumption that Congress has expressed its intent in the language it chose.").
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1142.
157. Id. at 1145.
158. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 95, at 235 n.5 (citing the Ninth Circuit's decision
approvingly).
159. Amalgamated Transit Union, 435 F.3d at 1146.
160. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 95, at 237-38.
161. 458 U.S. 564, 574-77 (1982).
162. Id. at 574-77.
163. Id. at 575.
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deeming statutory schemes "irrational" simply because the policies seem
misconceived.1 64 For the absurdity doctrine to remain "a legitimate tool of
the Judiciary," the Court has warned, courts must "act [ with self-
discipline" in deploying it.165 Otherwise, the doctrine threatens to
undermine the legislature and become a tool for judicial policymaking. In
order to limit the potential for this sort of abuse, the Court has tightly
circumscribed the circumstances in which the plain meaning of a statute
may be nullified absurd on the ground of irrationality: it must be "so
bizarre that Congress could not have intended it"166 or "so gross as to shock
the general moral or common sense."16 7 Thus, in most cases, even strange
or troubling results will not meet this standard. For example, in Bamhart v.
Sigmon Coal Co.,1 6 8 the Court refused to apply the absurdity doctrine even
where the plain meaning led to manifestly counterintuitive and anomalous
results. 169
In general, lower courts have heeded the Court's warnings about the
doctrine.1 70 Occasionally, though, because the Court has been less than
164. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 10 (1997) ("Given [a] clear
legislative directive, it is not for the courts to carve out statutory exceptions based on judicial
perceptions of good ... policy.").
165. Pub. Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989).
166. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991).
167. Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930); see also Small v. United States, 544
U.S. 385, 404 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("We should employ [the absurdity doctrine]
only where the result of applying the plain language would be, in a genuine sense, absurd,
i.e., where it is quite impossible that Congress could have intended the result ... and where
the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone.") (quoting Pub. Citizen,
491 U.S. at 470-7 1).
168. 534 U.S. 438, 459 (2002).
169. Id. at 459; see also Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 30, 32 (1989) (refusing
to use the absurdity doctrine even though petitioner's argued that strict construction of the
notice provision would result in procedural anomalies); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84,
93-96 (1985) (explaining why the Court should not decide a filing date other than the one in
the statute).
170. For example, the Eleventh Circuit cautioned as follows:
Though venerable, the [absurdity doctrine] is rarely applied, because the result
produced by the plain meaning canon must be truly absurd before the principle
trumps it. Otherwise, clearly expressed legislative decisions would be subject to
the policy predilections of judges. In other words, it is irrelevant that we may not
have made the same policy decision had the matter been ours to decide [if] we
cannot say that it is absurd, ridiculous, or ludicrous for Congress to have decided
the matter in the way the plain meaning of the statutory language indicates it did.
CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1228 (1ith Cir. 2001)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also McGhee v. Helsel, 686 N.W.2d 6, 8
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (declining to nullify the plain language of a statute and
declaring, "A result is not absurd merely because reasonable people viewing a statute
with the benefit of hindsight would conclude that the Legislature acted improvidently.
Courts may not rewrite the plain language of the statute and substitute their own policy
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clear in defining the absurdity doctrine, lower courts have pushed the
doctrine well beyond any defensible bounds.
IV. BEYOND ABSURD: THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S MISUSE OF THE
ABSURDITY DOCTRINE
Now that we have identified the different kinds of absurdity arguments,
we can better evaluate whether a particular invocation of the absurdity
doctrine is justified. The Third Circuit's decision in the horpe case is an
example of the most controversial use of the absurdity doctrine, and it
illustrates why it is necessary for the Supreme Court to clarify the doctrine's
proper application.
Although the court did not say so explicitly in its opinion, its invocation
of the absurdity doctrine in the Thorpe case resonates, at best, with the
fourth-and most controversial and limited-circumstance in which the
doctrine might apply to nullify plain statutory text. That is, the court
evidently concluded that applying the plain meaning of "museum" to the
Borough would be irrational. As noted above, the court identified two
supposed absurdities: first, the plain language would require repatriation
even where the original burial was "in accordance with the wishes of the
decedent's next-of-kin;"171 and second, that the statute would be used "to
settle familial disputes within Native American families."17 2
In nullifying the plain language on these grounds, the Third Circuit
ignored the Supreme Court's admonitions about the danger of the
absurdity doctrine and the need to avoid judicial policymaking. Indeed,
the plain language interpretation is entirely rational, harmonious with the
statute's structure, and consistent with Congress's purposes for enacting it.
Even if the court considered Congress's policy choices-reflected in the
statute's plain language-to be distasteful, overbroad, or ill-conceived, none
of these characteristics rises to the level of irrationality necessary to justify
nullifying NAGPRA's plain language.
A. NAGPRA's Plain Language Applies Even Where the Original Burial was in
Accordance with the Wishes of the Decedent's Next-of-Kin
The Third Circuit made much of the fact that Thorpe's burial in the
Borough was in accordance with the wishes of his next-of-kin, and thus
presumably lawful at the time.173 In light of this, the court concluded that
decisions for those already made by the Legislature").
171. Thorpe v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub
nom., Sac & Fox Nation of Oklahoma v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, 136 S. Ct. 84 (2015).
172. Id. at 265.
173. Id. at 257-58 (highlighting the District Court's opinion).
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applying NAGPRA in such cases would be absurd. The court cited no
language in the legislative history to support this assertion affirmatively.
Instead, it relied on its own apparent discomfort with the repatriation
requirement where the initial interment was lawful. 7 4 But NAGPRA's text
and structure make clear that human remains must be repatriated even
where, as here, the agency or museum lawfully obtained them.1 75
Two categories of objects are subject to NAGPRA: (1) human remains
and associated funerary objects; and (2) unassociated funerary objects,
sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony. 76 NAGPRA recognizes
that an agency or museum may have a right of possession to either type of
item. It defines a "right of possession" as "possession obtained with the
voluntary consent of an individual or group that had authority of
alienation."177 For human remains and associated funerary objects, a right
of possession exists where the object was "obtained with full knowledge and
consent of the next-of-kin."1 78 With respect to an unassociated funerary
object, sacred object, or object of cultural patrimony, a right of possession
exists where the object was obtained "from an Indian tribe or Native
Hawaiian organization with the voluntary consent of an individual or
174. See id. at 264-66.
175. The fact that Jim Thorpe's remains were buried rather than publicly displayed is
irrelevant. Whether the remains were actually displayed in a glass case or, as here, interred
underground as part of a shrine does not determine an entity's status as a museum. First,
the statute defines what it means to be a "museum," and that definition is paramount. See
Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 130 (2008) ("When a statute includes an explicit
definition, we must follow that definition. .. .") (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,
942 (2000)). Nothing in the statutory definition of "museum" suggests that a distinction
between interment and display of human remains is relevant. Second, even the plain or
dictionary meaning of the word "museum" easily encompassesJim Thorpe's mausoleum:
2.a. A building or portion of a building used as a repository for the preservation
and exhibition of objects illustrative of antiques, natural history, fine and
industrial art, or some particular branch of any of these subjects, either generally
or with reference to a definite region or period. Also applied to the collection of
objects itself.
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 123 (2d ed. 1991). Jim Thorpe's gravesite was
designed to bring in curious tourists and provide them with information and
entertainment. In fact, the towns of Mauch Chunk and East Mauch Chunk believed
that Thorpe's body could be used to generate revenue, and, once the towns combined,
the Borough built an above-ground mausoleum to attract visitors. See Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 10, Sac & Fox Nation of Oklahoma v. Borough ofJim Thorpe, 136 S.
Ct. 84 (2015) (No. 14-1419), 2015 WL 3486600, at *10. The gravesite therefore easily
falls within the dictionary meaning of "museum," even though Jim Thorpe's remains
are interred rather than displayed there.
176. See 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3) (2012) (defining "cultural items").
177. Id. § 3001(13).
178. Id.
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group with authority to alienate such object."'7 9
It was uncontested that the Borough had a right of possession to Jim
Thorpe's remains, as they were given to the Borough by Thorpe's lawful
next-of-kin. 8 0  Such a right of possession, however, does not free the
Borough from its obligations under NAGPRA. The statute explicitly
provides that a right of possession in Native American cultural items
confers benefits that differ depending on the object's category.' 8 ' Under
§ 7, if the agency or museum can "prove that it has a right of possession" to
"unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects [or] objects of cultural
patrimony," then it may retain them and need not return them to the
claimant-in other words, they are exempt from the repatriation
requirement.18 2
But NAGPRA does not extend this exemption to human remains or
associated funerary objects. 83  Instead, it provides that an agency or
museum holding a right of possession to such objects merely escapes
criminal prosecution for illegal trafficking.1 84 That is, unlike in cases where
the museum had no right of possession to the human remains, it will not be
subject to criminal penalties. Yet the repatriation requirement still
obligates the museum to return this category of objects to lawful claimants.
Thus, Congress recognized that an agency or museum might have
initially obtained human remains through lawful means, and it provided
certain benefits to possessors in those circumstances. But, as the plain
language of NAGPRA makes clear, Congress decided to treat human
remains and associated funerary objects differently from other kinds of
objects, requiring that they be returned to heirs or other enumerated
claimants. 8 5 Thus, how an entity initially obtained human remains has no
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. The Third Circuit appears to have overlooked or ignored the different treatment of
the two categories of objects. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22a, Sac & Fox Nation of
Oklahoma v. Borough of Jim Thorpe, 136 S. Ct. 84 (2015) (No. 14-1419), 2015 WL
3486600 (discussing 25 U.S.C. § 3001(13), which defines "right of possession" to include
human remains, but failing to mention 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2012), which provides that a
museum with a "right of possession" to human remains merely is immune from criminal
liability); see also supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
182. 25 U.S. C. § 3005(c) (2012).
183. See NAGPRA Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,134, 62,153 (Dec. 4, 1995) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 10) ("The right of possession basis for retaining cultural items in an
existing collection does not apply to human remains or associated funerary objects, only to
unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony.").
184. 18U.S.C.§ 1170.
185. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 3005(c) (providing that "unassociated funerary objects, sacred
objects or objects of cultural patrimony" should be returned to a lineal descendant or tribe),
with 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (governing the punishment for trafficking human remains of Native
Americans).
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bearing on its obligation to return them.
It is easy to imagine rational reasons why Congress may have chosen to
draw this distinction. First, it could have concluded that human remains
and associated funerary objects are qualitatively different from other kinds
of cultural items and bear more importance to tribes. This would justify
NAGPRA's different treatment of the two categories of objects.
Second, Congress could have drawn this distinction because of
differences in the property status of the two categories of objects. With
respect to repatriation, Congress initially made no distinction between
human remains and associated funerary objects, on the one hand, and
other cultural objects, on the other. 86 By the time the statute was enacted,
however, it provided for the two categories of objects to be treated
differently when the museum or agency had a right of possession. 8 7
Congress may have made this distinction due to a concern that, where a
right of possession to non-human remains existed, the repatriation
requirement could implicate the Takings Clause. But that concern did not
apply in the case of human remains. 8 8
Thus, not only is there nothing "irrational" in NAGPRA's plain
language, it is entirely consistent with the statute's internal structure and
logic and apparently the result of legislative policy choices.
B. NAGPRA Explicitly Anticipates and Provides Guidance for Resolving Familial
Disputes
The Third Circuit also identified a second purportedly absurd result of
applying the plain language: NAGPRA would be used to resolve disputes
within Native American families as to the proper treatment of ancestral
remains. As the court put it, NAGPRA was not intended "to settle [such]
familial disputes within Native American families." 89
This, too, misuses and unduly expands the absurdity doctrine. Congress
well understood that NAGPRA could give rise to family disputes. First,
simply as a matter of logic, any scheme that-like NAGPRA gives remote
186. As introduced on July 10, 1990, NAGPRA's repatriation requirement made no
distinction between the two categories of objects. See H.R. 5237, 101st Cong. § 6(a) (1990).
187. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(c).
188. See NAGPRA Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 62,153 ("American law generally
recognizes that human remains cannot be 'owned."'); cf H.R. REP. No. 101-877, at 14-15,
24-27 (1990) (noting that definition of "right of possession ... was amended.... The
language was adopted to meet the concerns of the Justice Department about the possibility
of a 5th amendment taking of the private property of museums through the application of
the terms of the Act.").
189. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19a, Sac & Fox Nation of Oklahoma v. Borough
ofJim Thorpe, 136 S. Ct. 84 (2015) (No. 14-1419), 2015 WL 3486600.
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descendants the opportunity to make claims on ancestral remains and other
objects invariably invites competing claims. After all, different descendants
might have different views on the matter.
Second, even a cursory review of NAGPRA's language reveals that
Congress explicitly anticipated family disputes and created an
administrative process for resolving them. Section 7 provides that if there
are "competing claims" concerning an object, then "the agency or museum
may retain [the] item" until the dispute is resolved. 90 Moreover, the
statute provides a mechanism for resolving familial disputes over an item's
disposition. Section 8 directs the Secretary of the Interior to establish a
review committee tasked with "monitor[ing] and review[ing] the
implementation of the . . . repatriation activities required [by
NAGPRA]."191 Most notably, section 8(c)(4) charges the review committee
with "facilitating the resolution of any disputes among Indian tribes, Native
Hawaiian organizations, or lineal descendants and Federal agencies or
museums relating to the return of such items. . . ."192 To resolve disputes,
the review committee is directed to compile a report and recommendations
for proper handling of such disputed items.1 93 If resolution cannot be
achieved through this administrative process, NAGPRA grants federal
district courts ultimate enforcement authority.1 94  In a district court
proceeding under this section, the review committee's report and
recommendation are admissible evidence.1 95
Although NAGPRA does not mandate exhaustion of this administrative
process prior to initiating suit in a district court, the fact that Congress
created this detailed process demonstrates that it fully expected that there
could be competing claimants. That manifest expectation defeats the
notion that the possibility of intra-familial disputes justifies application of
the absurdity doctrine. Of course, a disinterested observer might question
the wisdom of the mechanism Congress devised for resolving such disputes.
But given that Congress explicitly incorporated that mechanism into the
statutory scheme, there is no legitimate basis for applying the absurdity
doctrine on the ground that the statute's plain meaning would implicate
intra-familial disputes.
190. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(e) (2012).
191. Id. § 3006(a).
192. Id. § 3006(c)(4) (emphasis added).
193. Id. §§ 3006(c)(9), (e).
194. Id. 3013.
195. Id. § 3006(d).
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C. The Third Circuit's Opinion Would Not Eliminate the Supposed Absurdities
Even assuming that the result of applying the plain language might be
irrational for the reasons given by the Third Circuit, the court's decision
would not have eliminated these absurdities-a fact that further
underscores the extent to which the court's decision untethers the absurdity
doctrine from its proper moorings.
Suppose that the next of kin of a Native American had given that
person's remains to an entity that is a "real" museum in the eyes of the
Third Circuit, and that certain lineal heirs then made a claim for
repatriation. Just as in the horpe case, the museum would hold a right of
possession, and a dispute could arise among the family members. That is,
these supposed absurdities could occur in even the most run-of-the-mill
cases that come within NAGPRA's scope. Nullifying NAGPRA's plain
language to negate the Borough's status as a museum therefore does
nothing at all to address the Third Circuit's concerns, as there is no
connection between its reasoning (that the statute may give rise to absurd
results) and its ultimate holding (that the Borough is not a "museum" as
defined in § 2 of NAGPRA).
In sum, applying the plain language in the Thorpe case leads to no
absurdities at all, but only to results that are fully anticipated by, consistent
with, and provided for in the statutory scheme.
CONCLUSION
For committed Textualists, the Third Circuit's opinion in horpe is low-
hanging fruit because the absurdity doctrine should almost never be applied
in the absence of statutory ambiguity. But the opinion should equally
trouble non-Textualists, for it strengthens Textualists' rule-of-law critique of
non-Textualist methodologies and reinforces the image of non-Textualist
judges as legislators in robes. But more than anything, this case illustrates
that the absurdity doctrine is an interpretive weapon that must be wielded
cautiously and brandished rarely. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has
provided precious little guidance to prevent lower courts from misusing it.
Our proposed taxonomy of absurdities offers a useful way of systematizing
and appropriately cabining the use of the absurdity doctrine.
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